{
 "version": "https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1",
 "title": "wolfssl: important CVE events",
 "home_page_url": "https://patchwire.jonathanross.dev/products/wolfssl--wolfssl/",
 "feed_url": "https://patchwire.jonathanross.dev/feeds/products/wolfssl--wolfssl/important.json",
 "authors": [
  {
   "name": "Patchwire"
  }
 ],
 "language": "en",
 "items": [
  {
   "id": "tag:patchwire.jonathanross.dev,2026:CVE-2026-89102/disclosed",
   "url": "https://patchwire.jonathanross.dev/cve/CVE-2026-89102/",
   "title": "CVE-2026-89102 · wolfssl · disclosed",
   "content_text": "In wolfSSL versions 5.7.2 through 5.9.2 there is a client-side implementation flaw in RFC 6961, multiple OCSP response stapling, which can lead to certificate forgery. When a wolfSSL client enables OCSP stapling with the HAVE_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_REQUEST_V2 feature and calls wolfSSL_UseOCSPStaplingV2(ssl, WOLFSSL_CSR2_OCSP_MULTI, options), the client accepts any certificate in the peer's chain as a certificate authority without verifying that the certificate is actually authorized to act as one. This means that an attacker who possesses any certificate that chains to a CA trusted by the client (along with its private key) can forge certificates for arbitrary identities that will be accepted as valid by the client. The end entity certificate of the server is stored in the persistent trust store, affecting subsequent connections that reuse the context even when OCSP multi usage is not employed. Found by internal wolfSSL testing.",
   "date_published": "2026-09-27T09:22:42Z"
  },
  {
   "id": "tag:patchwire.jonathanross.dev,2026:CVE-2026-89136/disclosed",
   "url": "https://patchwire.jonathanross.dev/cve/CVE-2026-89136/",
   "title": "CVE-2026-89136 · wolfssl · disclosed",
   "content_text": "When using RPK (Raw Public Key), the client side of a TLS 1.2, 1.3 and DTLS 1.2 connection could accept an unsolicited server_cert_type=RawPublicKey which allowed a malicious or misbehaving server to bypass authentication. RPK is off by default and only enabled in --enable-rpk OR --enable-all OR --enable-distro AKA HAVE_RPK builds.",
   "date_published": "2026-09-27T09:12:39Z"
  },
  {
   "id": "tag:patchwire.jonathanross.dev,2026:CVE-2026-93302/disclosed",
   "url": "https://patchwire.jonathanross.dev/cve/CVE-2026-93302/",
   "title": "CVE-2026-93302 · wolfssl · disclosed",
   "content_text": "MatchTrustedPeer ignores the public key used, leading to forged CA clones passing verification. Affected builds are any that enable the macro WOLFSSL_TRUST_PEER_CERT and load CA certificates with wolfSSL_CTX_trust_peer_cert() or wolfSSL_trust_peer_cert(). The peer must know the certificates being loaded to either of those APIs to take advantage of the issue. When OPENSSL_COMPATIBLE_DEFAULTS is also defined this widens the affected API to include all CA certificate loading. Both macros are defined when using autoconf builds such as (nginx, haproxy, stunnel, wpas, apache httpd, hitch, bind, rsyslog, ffmpeg, all, distro). When the certificate is listed as a trusted peer certificate the issue previously allowed for a malicious (D)TLS server to bypass authentication once knowing which CA’s the client would accept. This also affects mutual authentication cases where the client knows which CA’s the server has loaded. If building with any of these configurations and using (D)TLS where the loaded CA’s could be known and authentication of the peer is desired, users should either: update to the latest wolfSSL version, apply the fix patch, or use the configure flag --disable-openssl-compatible-defaults and not load CA’s with wolfSSL_CTX_trust_peer_cert() or wolfSSL_trust_peer_cert() to mitigate the issue.",
   "date_published": "2026-09-27T09:07:35Z"
  }
 ]
}