{
 "version": "https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1",
 "title": "Apache Software Foundation Apache Pulsar: important CVE events",
 "home_page_url": "https://patchwire.jonathanross.dev/products/apache-software-foundation--apache-pulsar/",
 "feed_url": "https://patchwire.jonathanross.dev/feeds/products/apache-software-foundation--apache-pulsar/important.json",
 "authors": [
  {
   "name": "Patchwire"
  }
 ],
 "language": "en",
 "items": [
  {
   "id": "tag:patchwire.jonathanross.dev,2026:CVE-2026-105945/disclosed",
   "url": "https://patchwire.jonathanross.dev/cve/CVE-2026-105945/",
   "title": "CVE-2026-105945 disclosed",
   "content_text": "The Pulsar Packages Management Service can be configured to store packages on the local filesystem of the broker by using the filesystem storage provider. Package names consist of a type, tenant, namespace, name and version. Authorization of package operations is based only on the tenant and namespace, while the storage location of a package is derived from all of these components. The version component of a package name was not validated, so it could contain URL-encoded path separators and parent directory references. The filesystem storage provider resolved such a version to a location belonging to a package in a different tenant or namespace. Because that location is inside the configured storage directory, the containment check that the filesystem storage provider performs in recent releases did not prevent the access.\n\nAn authenticated user who has the packages permission on any namespace could use this to download, overwrite or delete packages stored in other tenants or namespaces for which the user has no permission. Packages overwritten or deleted in this way may be used by Pulsar Functions, Sources or Sinks, so the issue can affect the integrity and availability of these components. If authentication is disabled, the operations are available to any client that can reach the broker's admin REST API.\n\nThis issue only affects deployments in which package management is enabled with the broker setting enablePackagesManagement and the filesystem storage provider (FileSystemPackagesStorageProvider) is configured with the setting packagesManagementStorageProvider. Package management is disabled by default, and the default storage provider, which stores packages in Apache BookKeeper, is not affected.\n\nThis issue affects Apache Pulsar versions from 2.10.0 before 4.0.14 and from 4.1.0 before 4.2.5.\n\n- 4.0.x version users should upgrade to at least 4.0.14.\n- 4.1.x and 4.2.x version users should upgrade to at least 4.2.5.\n\nUsers operating versions prior to those listed above should upgrade to the aforementioned patched versions or newer versions.\n\nThe currently supported Apache Pulsar release lines are 4.0.x and 5.0.x. The supported versions schedule is available at https://pulsar.apache.org/contribute/release-policy/.",
   "date_published": "2026-10-21T18:18:26Z"
  },
  {
   "id": "tag:patchwire.jonathanross.dev,2026:CVE-2026-105942/disclosed",
   "url": "https://patchwire.jonathanross.dev/cve/CVE-2026-105942/",
   "title": "CVE-2026-105942 disclosed",
   "content_text": "When a configured proxy role sends a request to the broker on behalf of another user (the original principal), the broker is designed to authorize both the proxy role and the original principal and to allow the request only if both are authorized, so that the original principal cannot exceed its own permissions. Two flaws weakened this check.\n\nFirst, the original principal was authorized with the proxy's authentication data instead of its own. On the admin REST API of the broker and the functions worker, this applied to every proxied request. On the Pulsar binary protocol, it applied when the proxy did not forward the client's credentials to the broker, which was the default of the Pulsar proxy in the affected versions. Authorization providers that resolve permissions from the role name only, such as the default authorization provider, are not affected by this flaw. The multi-role token authorization provider (MultiRolesTokenAuthorizationProvider), added in Apache Pulsar 2.8.1, resolves roles from the role claim of the token in the authentication data it is given. When a proxy authenticates to the broker with its own token, the original principal was therefore authorized with all roles in the proxy's token. If any of those roles is a superuser or tenant admin role, any user whose requests are forwarded by that proxy can perform operations that need those permissions without holding them. Custom authorization providers that use the authentication data could be affected in a similar way.\n\nSecond, independently of the authorization provider, the tenant admin check of a proxied admin REST API request succeeded without checking the original principal when the proxy role was itself an admin role of the tenant. In deployments where a proxy role is a tenant admin, including with the default authorization provider, any user whose requests are forwarded by that proxy could perform tenant administration operations on that tenant. This behavior is present from 2.8.4 in the 2.8.x releases, from 2.9.3 in the 2.9.x releases, and from 2.10.1 onwards.\n\nDeployments that use neither the multi-role token authorization provider nor a custom provider that uses the authentication data are not affected by the first flaw, and with the multi-role token authorization provider, neither are deployments whose proxies do not authenticate to the broker with a token. Deployments in which no proxy role is listed as an admin role of a tenant are not affected by the second flaw. A proxy role that is a superuser but is not listed as a tenant admin does not trigger it, because the tenant admin check of the built-in authorization providers only considers the tenant's admin roles; this can differ for custom authorization providers that treat superusers as tenant admins.\n\nIn fixed versions, both the proxy role and the original principal are authorized for each proxied request, and the original principal is authorized only with its own authentication data. With the multi-role token authorization provider, the roles of a forwarded token are used for the original principal only when that token authenticates as the original principal; otherwise only the original principal's role name is used. For tenant admin checks, the proxy role and the original principal must each be a superuser or a tenant admin of the tenant.\n\nThis issue affects Apache Pulsar versions from 2.8.1 before 4.0.14 and from 4.1.0 before 4.2.5.\n\n- 4.0.x version users should upgrade to at least 4.0.14.\n- 4.1.x and 4.2.x version users should upgrade to at least 4.2.5.\n\nUsers operating versions prior to those listed above should upgrade to the aforementioned patched versions or newer versions.\n\nThe currently supported Apache Pulsar release lines are 4.0.x and 5.0.x. The supported versions schedule is available at https://pulsar.apache.org/contribute/release-policy/.",
   "date_published": "2026-10-21T18:14:35Z"
  },
  {
   "id": "tag:patchwire.jonathanross.dev,2026:CVE-2026-105937/disclosed",
   "url": "https://patchwire.jonathanross.dev/cve/CVE-2026-105937/",
   "title": "CVE-2026-105937 disclosed",
   "content_text": "Apache Pulsar shadow topics (PIP-180) are topics that read the stored messages of a source topic from that topic's managed ledger. The source topic is selected by setting the reserved topic property PULSAR.SHADOW_SOURCE. The admin REST API accepts this property when creating a non-partitioned or partitioned topic and when updating the properties of an existing topic. On these paths the broker authorizes the caller only against the topic being created or updated. It does not authorize the caller against the source topic named in the property. The existing authorization for shadow topic configuration (the SHADOW_TOPIC topic policy on the source topic) is applied only to the source-side shadow topics admin API, not to these paths.\n\nAs a result, an authenticated user who is allowed to create topics or update topic properties in one tenant can bind a topic in that tenant to a persistent topic in any other tenant. With the default authorization provider, these operations require the tenant admin role for the user's own tenant. The user does not need any permission on the source topic, its namespace or its tenant. This impact analysis assumes that Pulsar has been configured with the default authorization provider. For custom authorization providers, the impact could be different.\n\nThe user can then consume from the shadow topic, using only permissions on their own topic, and receive retained messages that were published to the source topic in the other tenant. Exposure is limited to messages that are still retained and readable in the source topic's ledgers; messages protected with client-side end-to-end encryption cannot be decrypted without the encryption keys. A producer on the shadow topic can also register a new schema version under the source topic's schema, subject to the schema compatibility settings; existing schema versions are not replaced.\n\nIn addition, the shadow topic's managed ledger applies its own retention, trimming, offloading and deletion to the source topic's ledgers. This can permanently delete the source topic's ledger data from BookKeeper and from tiered storage, regardless of the source topic's own subscriptions and retention policy, including messages that have not yet been acknowledged. Deleting the shadow topic can also delete the source topic's ledgers. This data loss can also affect shadow topics that were configured intentionally by administrators.\n\nThis issue affects Apache Pulsar versions from 3.0.0 before 4.0.14 and from 4.1.0 before 4.2.5. Apache Pulsar 2.x releases do not contain the shadow topic implementation.\n\n- 4.0.x version users should upgrade to at least 4.0.14.\n- 4.1.x and 4.2.x version users should upgrade to at least 4.2.5.\n\nUsers operating versions prior to those listed above should upgrade to the aforementioned patched versions or newer versions.\n\nThe currently supported Apache Pulsar release lines are 4.0.x and 5.0.x. The supported versions schedule is available at https://pulsar.apache.org/contribute/release-policy/.\n\nIn the fixed versions, shadow topics are disabled by default and are controlled by the new broker configuration setting enableShadowTopics (default false). While it is disabled, the broker rejects creating shadow topics, setting the PULSAR.SHADOW_SOURCE property, and loading or replicating to existing shadow topics. Deployments that use shadow topics must set enableShadowTopics=true in the broker configuration of all brokers after upgrading; otherwise existing shadow topics will not be loaded. When shadow topics are enabled, binding a shadow topic to a source topic in a different tenant requires the superuser role. The fixed versions also prevent a shadow topic from deleting or trimming the ledgers and offloaded data of its source topic.\n\nAffected versions provide no configuration option to disable shadow topics. Users who cannot upgrade immediately can reduce exposure by granting the tenant admin role only to trusted principals.",
   "date_published": "2026-10-21T18:12:51Z"
  },
  {
   "id": "tag:patchwire.jonathanross.dev,2026:CVE-2026-105934/disclosed",
   "url": "https://patchwire.jonathanross.dev/cve/CVE-2026-105934/",
   "title": "CVE-2026-105934 disclosed",
   "content_text": "The Apache Pulsar broker admin REST API provides a truncate operation for persistent topics (DELETE /admin/v2/persistent/{tenant}/{namespace}/{topic}/truncate). Truncating a topic moves all subscription cursors of the topic to the end of the topic and deletes the topic's inactive ledgers. Truncating a non-partitioned topic, or a single partition addressed by its partition name, correctly requires the tenant admin role or the superuser role. When the operation is requested for the name of a partitioned topic, the broker does not apply this tenant admin check to the caller. Instead, it truncates each partition using the broker's own internal admin client, which authenticates with the broker's configured client credentials rather than the caller's identity. Each per-partition truncate request is still checked for the tenant admin role or the superuser role, but against the broker's internal identity instead of the caller. The partitions are therefore truncated only when the broker's configured client role is a superuser or an admin of the target tenant, which is the usual configuration when authorization is enabled.\n\nAs a result, when that condition holds, an authenticated user who is not a tenant admin can truncate any partitioned topic on which the user has lookup permission. Caller authentication and lookup permission alone are not sufficient: if the broker's internal identity lacks tenant admin or superuser authorization for the target tenant, the per-partition requests are rejected. With the default authorization provider, lookup permission is granted by produce or consume permission on the topic or its namespace. A user with no permissions on the topic cannot trigger the issue. This impact analysis assumes that Pulsar has been configured with the default authorization provider. For custom authorization providers, the impact could be different.\n\nTruncating a partitioned topic this way moves the cursors of all subscriptions on every partition to the end of the topic, so any unacknowledged backlog is skipped and is no longer delivered to consumers. It also deletes eligible older ledgers of each partition regardless of the namespace's configured retention policy, so messages stored in those ledgers can be permanently lost. The ledger currently being written is not deleted by the truncate operation. The issue does not allow reading message contents or changing permissions or configuration, and it does not give access to topics on which the user has no lookup permission.\n\nThis issue affects Apache Pulsar versions from 2.8.0 before 4.0.14 and from 4.1.0 before 4.2.5.\n\n- 4.0.x version users should upgrade to at least 4.0.14.\n- 4.1.x and 4.2.x version users should upgrade to at least 4.2.5.\n\nUsers operating versions prior to those listed above should upgrade to the aforementioned patched versions or newer versions.\n\nThe currently supported Apache Pulsar release lines are 4.0.x and 5.0.x. The supported versions schedule is available at https://pulsar.apache.org/contribute/release-policy/.\n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately can reduce exposure by restricting network access to the broker's admin REST API (/admin/v2) to trusted administrative clients.",
   "date_published": "2026-10-21T18:08:43Z"
  },
  {
   "id": "tag:patchwire.jonathanross.dev,2026:CVE-2026-105869/disclosed",
   "url": "https://patchwire.jonathanross.dev/cve/CVE-2026-105869/",
   "title": "CVE-2026-105869 disclosed",
   "content_text": "Apache Pulsar's MultiRolesTokenAuthorizationProvider authorizes a client with all roles listed in a claim of its JSON Web Token (JWT). The provider is intended for use with token authentication, which verifies the token before authorization. The provider did not verify the token itself: it parsed the token's claims with the signature removed and trusted that authentication had already checked it.\n\nWhen authentication and authorization are enabled with a non-empty anonymousUserRole setting, some HTTP requests whose credentials fail authentication are not rejected, but are handled as requests of the anonymous user role. For the broker's HTTP endpoints, such as the admin REST API, this fallback applies to requests that do not name an authentication method and requires strictAuthMethod to be false (the default) where that setting is available. For the WebSocket API, failed credentials can also fall back to the anonymous user role; this path does not enforce strictAuthMethod. The authentication data kept for such a request still contained the request's Authorization header. MultiRolesTokenAuthorizationProvider then read the bearer token from that header without verifying its signature and authorized the request with the roles in the token's role claim.\n\nAs a result, in deployments that use MultiRolesTokenAuthorizationProvider together with a non-empty anonymousUserRole and that permit this fallback, an unauthenticated client can send an HTTP request, for example to the admin REST API or the WebSocket API, with a forged or unsigned token that lists arbitrary roles, and be authorized with those roles. The impact can include super-user access when the token lists a role configured in superUserRoles, allowing the client to read and change tenants, namespaces, topics, permissions and broker configuration. No valid credentials are required.\n\nDeployments are not affected if they use the default authorization provider (PulsarAuthorizationProvider) or another authorization provider, or if anonymousUserRole is not set (the default). Requests that authenticate successfully with a valid token are not affected, because the token that MultiRolesTokenAuthorizationProvider reads is the token that authentication verified. Connections that use the Pulsar binary protocol are not affected by this issue, because the broker does not keep client authentication data for connections that it assigns to the anonymous user role.\n\nIn fixed versions, MultiRolesTokenAuthorizationProvider obtains roles only from tokens that the configured token authentication provider has verified, using its configured keys and validation settings. Broker HTTP requests that are assigned to the anonymous user role are authorized only as that role, and invalid tokens cannot supply additional roles to WebSocket requests. The broker fails to start if MultiRolesTokenAuthorizationProvider is configured with authorization enabled but without a token authentication provider.\n\nThis issue affects Apache Pulsar versions from 2.8.1 before 4.0.14 and from 4.1.0 before 4.2.5.\n\n- 4.0.x version users should upgrade to at least 4.0.14.\n- 4.1.x and 4.2.x version users should upgrade to at least 4.2.5.\n\nUsers operating versions prior to those listed above should upgrade to the aforementioned patched versions or newer versions.\n\nThe currently supported Apache Pulsar release lines are 4.0.x and 5.0.x. The supported versions schedule is available at https://pulsar.apache.org/contribute/release-policy/.\n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately can remove the anonymousUserRole setting from the broker and WebSocket service configurations, or restrict network access to the HTTP endpoints of these services to trusted clients.",
   "date_published": "2026-10-21T17:58:54Z"
  }
 ]
}